

Sarajevo, the capital city of [Bosnia and Herzegovina](#), a former Federal State of Yugoslavia, once symbolized a rich tradition of multi-culturalism and multi-ethnicity.

In 1984, when Sarajevo hosted the Winter Olympics, it was celebrated as one of the most sophisticated, progressive, and cosmopolitan cities of Europe. Its citizens were representative of all faiths, Muslim Bosniaks, Orthodox Serbs, Catholic Croats, even a small Jewish community.

Just eight years later Yugoslavia disintegrated, as ethnic nationalism, religious hatred, fear and distrust permeated the country and the countryside. Sarajevo became the major battlefield and focal point of the Bosnian War, a long, complex, and unexpected ethnic conflict, waged in the heart of Europe.

From April 1992 to the end of February 1996, Sarajevo was besieged by the Bosnian Orthodox Serb army of their self-declared State of Republika Srpska. Their strategic goal was to create the new autonomous Bosnian Serb state that would include Bosniak-majority areas.

For generations many Orthodox Serbs believed that during the Ottoman occupation wealthy, opportunistic, and cowardly Serbian elites converted from Christianity to Islam. Such distorted history provided the core foundation for a virulent campaign of dehumanizing propaganda against Muslims.

Radovan Karadžić, the Bosnian Serb President of the new Republika Srpska (RS), asserted that his forces were dedicated to “taking back” Sarajevo from the “Turks,” the derogatory term he most often used for Muslims, and return it to its “rightful owners.”

The cruel siege and blockade lasted three times longer than WWII's [infamous Battle of Stalingrad](#). At [1,425 days](#), it was the longest siege of a capital city in the history of modern warfare.

Mt. Igman, and other surrounding heights of the Dinaric Alps, were once the site of alpine and Nordic skiing, venues of intense, but peaceful athletic competition, dedicated to the Olympian ideals of solidarity, and “of building a peaceful and better world, without discrimination of any kind.” Now they were the sites of hostile, extreme nationalist snipers' nests, artillery and tanks. Sarajevo, once embraced, was abandoned by the world, in part, because Western leadership, especially in the United States believed it could do little to reconcile what it considered ancient antagonists. The EU and NATO were revealed to be hypocritical and feckless. Russias backed its ally, Serbia.

The Bosnian Serb forces of 13,000 soldiers, with the backing of the Serb-dominated Yugoslav army were heavy armed and well-positioned to reign terror on Sarajevo. Its 500,000 citizens were trapped in the city's heavily concentrated urban area, situated in a restricted narrow valley.

The [Bosnian government defence forces \(ARBiH\)](#) inside the besieged city, approximately 70,000 troops, were primarily infantry, and without heavy weapons, were unable to break the siege. It was an uneven struggle. The ARBiH suffered 6,137 fatalities, while Bosnian Serb military casualties numbered 2,241. A total of 13,952 people were killed during the siege, including 5,434 civilians.

Estimates of the broader war's three and half year grim toll varies widely, ranging from 90,000 to 300,000 casualties, military and civilian, for all sides involved.

The bitter hostilities were marked by the indiscriminate, deliberate, and frequent targeting of non-combatants. 82% or 33,071 of the civilians killed were Bosniak. Depraved atrocities by paramilitary death squads, systemic rape, ugly ethnic cleansing, and the extensive internal displacement of people tore through the former Yugoslavia Republics of both Bosnia and Croatia.

Concentration and extermination camps appeared for the first time in Europe since the Nazi Reich. While all sides were complicit, Serb actions were distinctive for harsh tactics and gratuitous violence. The distortion and

weaponization of history, drawing on deep Serbian resentment of centuries-old Ottoman occupation, intense religious antagonism, and the still raw desire for revenge for the internecine atrocities of WWII, stoked the rationale for ethnic and sectarian hatred. Intermarried families were dishearteningly ripped apart by antagonism and suspicion.

Criminal black marketeers, an imbalanced UN arms embargo that favored the Serbs, and diplomatic betrayals intensified and prolonged the fighting.

The siege exposed many perverse realities. The rise of armed Bosniak criminal militias, both defended the city and exploited its people. In one infamous incident, Bosnian Opera cellist, Mr. Smailovic, who performed daily in the city's ruins to honor its dead, was taken by Cuco, a Bosniak warlord who had a disdain for cultural intellectuals as being "soft," and forced for weeks on end to dig front line trenches, exposed to sniper fire.

Too many cruel, indecent incidents were the norm.

Two 25 year-old lovers, attempting to escape the siege, are remembered as the "Romeo and Juliet of Sarajevo. Bosko Brkic and Admira Ismic, he a Bosnian Serb Orthodox Christian, she a Bosniak Muslim, were tragically killed by the siege's omnipresent snipers, despite a brokered cease-fire. Their intertwined, embraced bodies were left exposed for weeks, despite their parents' desperate efforts to retrieve them for burial.

A controversial UN peacekeeper presence proved feckless. They could not protect alleged safe havens, or worse, prevent atrocities. The notorious massacre of Srebrenica carried out by Serb RS forces, where more than 8,000 Bosniak Muslim men and boys were killed and then buried in hidden and dispersed mass graves, was the apogee of brutality. It prompted the creation of a precedent-setting International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and a historic civil law suit brought before the International Court of Justice. They were both convened to investigate war crimes and the assertion of genocide against the Bosniak Muslims by Serbian forces. They were the first such chilling charges since the Holocaust, and the Nuremberg Tribunal.

Deliberate Serbian attacks on religious and cultural targets, mosques, renowned architectural buildings, and the firebombing of the historic Sarajevo National Library and Oriental Institute, with the loss of thousands of rare volumes and manuscripts, convinced scholars that charges of "cultural genocide" were also appropriate.

NATO's unprecedented intervention and the bombing of the Serb capital, Belgrade finally stopped the overt hostilities. The imperfect Dayton Peace Accord fractured whatever possible post-war unity could exist, creating intolerable and unrealistic boundaries and borders. It also mandated perhaps the most complex system of governance in the world.

After the war, the [International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia](#) (ICTY) convicted four Serb officials for numerous counts of [crimes against humanity](#), including sadistic [terrorism](#). [Stanislav Galić](#) and [Dragomir Milošević](#) who were in charge of Sarajevo's siege were sentenced to [life imprisonment](#), and 29 years imprisonment respectively. Their superiors, [Radovan Karadžić](#) and [Ratko Mladić](#), were also convicted of personal responsibility and sentenced to life imprisonment. Former Yugoslav president Slobodan Milošević died in his prison cell of a heart attack while being tried for war crimes at the ICTY in The Hague.

Some accountability came in extrajudicial ways. Zeljko Raznatovic, or "Arkan," a convicted murderer, was the notorious sadistic paramilitary killer whose "Tigers" were responsible for most of the initial ethnic cleansing of the war. He was killed by unknown assailants in Belgrade in 2000. Ron Haviv's chilling photographs record both his arrogant braggadocio and his atrocities.

It was some measure of closure.

How did all this agony come to pass?

For decades Yugoslavia was a powerful unified country under the authoritarian leadership of Josip Broz Tito, elected "President for Life," who ruled for almost thirty years.

Tito, a long time member of the Yugoslav Communist Party came to prominence in 1941 as the powerful leader of [its Partisans](#), often regarded as the most effective [resistance movement](#) in [Nazi-occupied Europe](#).

The tensions of multiethnic Yugoslavia were brutally evident during the fighting of World War II, with Catholic Croatia aligning its loyalties with Nazi Germany, and the Orthodox Serbs aligned with the Allies.

The Croatian *Ustasha* were a particularly heinous fascist, ultranationalist terrorist organization that murdered hundreds of thousands of Serbs, Jews, and Roma. Embracing Nazi racial ideas they deemed Slavs as sub-humans. They viewed the Bosniaks as "Muslim Croats." They understood themselves as a superior Germanic race, and through their extermination plans, sought a "pure" Croat state.

Yugoslavia's glaring fault lines were further exacerbated in the postwar period of intense warfare between the *Ustasha*, Monarchist *Chetniks*, who sought the restoration of a Kingdom, and the Communist partisans. The *Ustasha*'s extermination camp Jasenovac, was especially horrid, even by Nazi SS standards.

The dominant Serb partisans ultimately prevailed. Determined to be independent of all internal and external influences, Tito had broken all opposition, already declaring in 1943 that the Royal Yugoslav Government-in-exile was illegitimate. He ensured that King Peter II would not be allowed to return home.

Establishing a powerful military, Tito defied Stalin's Soviet hegemony, defined his country's own distinctive socialist program, and nurtured a cult of personality. Domestically with an iron rule, he created an independent, idiosyncratic Communist regime. As a leader of the Non-Aligned Movement he also gained international prestige and leverage.

Under his Presidency the [Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia](#) began in 1953. The Federal state consisted of six distinct nations: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia.

The [1974 Yugoslav Constitution](#) defined [SFR Yugoslavia](#) in typical constitutional and idealistic terms as a "*federal republic of equal nations and nationalities, freely united on the principle of [brotherhood and unity](#) in achieving specific and common interest.*"

Confident of his strong rule from the Federal capital, Belgrade, each Republic was also importantly given the legal right to [self-determination](#) and [secession](#). Tito also gave [Kosovo](#), a [constituent province of Serbia](#), substantial autonomy, including *de facto* veto power in the [Serbian parliament](#).

Himself of Croat and Slovene descent, Tito successfully kept both ethnic and sovereign tensions under control. In Tito's socialist Yugoslavia no ethnic group was termed a minority, regardless of its proportional demographic number, or its territorial size, rather majorities and minorities were classified as nations and nationalities.

His regime increased urbanization and higher rates of education. The hope was that such progress would reduce nationalist independence aspirations, and diminish sectarian ethnic identity, allowing for the binding power of common Southern Slavic traditions and culture to prevail. This did not materialize.

Materially the country's unity was strained by a series of severe economic crises. Highly dependent on oil imports it was hit hard by the 1973 global oil crisis and was soon in deep debt to the IMF, which insisted on rigorous structural reforms. The economic tension heightened the rivalry between richer and poorer Republics. Tough austerity measures undermined Federal legitimacy, and the individual states imposed import taxes on their fellow States, increasing divisive antagonism.

With Tito's death in 1980, his carefully curated balance of coexistence began to disintegrate.

Finally in 1989, Eastern Europe witnessed the rapid destabilizing collapse of Communism and the splintering of the Soviet bloc. Yugoslavia's dissolution began its downward spiral when independent, non-communist nationalist governments were established in the Yugoslav Republics of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia.

A decade after [his death](#), Tito's tenuous multiethnic coexistence was thoroughly fractured. With the exception of Slovenia, which had a homogeneous ethnic identity, the other geographical entities of Yugoslavia were diffused with distinct religious and ethnic groups, affiliations, and separate strong traditions.

Tito's death revealed the extraordinary schisms that had been repressed by decades of centralized dictatorship. It was disintegrated by ethnic nationalism, religious enmity, and hatred between, and among, its diverse communities, all of which were exposed by the increasing demands for autonomy of the disparate Republics.

In April 1992, the government of the Yugoslav republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina following a referendum boycotted by its Serb citizens, had already declared its independence from Yugoslavia. The EU and the United States recognized it as an independent state. It triggered the larger civil war between the Republic's Bosniak, Croats, and Serbs population. The army of Republika Sprska begins the siege of Sarajevo.

Bosnian demographics were an especially complicated reality. At the time of its breakaway referendum its population was an intermingled, volatile multiethnic mix of Muslim Bosniacs (44%), Orthodox Serbs (31%), and Catholic Croats (17%).

The consuming fire of bitter religious and historical grievances were stoked and manipulated by Serb ultra-nationalists, especially the invocation of the pain of the distant five-century Ottoman occupation.

Many Bosnian Serbs looked upon the Bosniak Muslims as being heretical Christians, and as having betrayed their heritage during Ottoman occupation, converting to Islam. Woven into Serbian tradition and history was the belief that stolen Bosnian Christian boys were taken as slaves to be trained as *Janissaries*, the Ottoman empire's elite soldiers.

The distortion and misuse of history would be seen most starkly in the Serbian nationalist rallies held in Kosovo and Bosnia.

In 1989, Serbian ultra President Slobodan Milosevic gave an inflammatory speech on the site of a symbolic hallowed battleground, the "Field of Blackbirds." Hundreds of thousands of Serbs gathered to commemorate the six hundredth anniversary of the battle of Kosovo, led by their venerated and allegedly betrayed Prince Lazar, who died failing to defeat the invading Sultan Murad's forces. It was considered consecrated ground, the fault line dividing East and West, Islam and Christendom, the irredeemable schism between the "cross and the crescent."

The Bosnian Serb leadership chose trauma, and national myth, even centuries removed, to justify vicious revenge.

General Ratko Mladić, the Bosnian Serb former military commander and convicted war criminal talked of presenting Sarajevo to the Serbian people as a "gift." He declared the time had come to take revenge on the "Turks" in the region, apparently referring to an 1804 slave rebellion that was savagely crushed by the Ottoman rulers. His command of the forces that conducted the heinous Srebrenica massacre told the world unequivocally that this distorted history was to be exploited with vicious results.

There are many narratives that attempt to explain the fracturing of Yugoslavia, ranging from such dubious historical religious narratives, to a stark division of attitudes towards Federalism between urban and rural

areas. One theory by political scientists, Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder is that democratizing states are at elevated risk of war due to transitional institutional weakness that can be exploited by elites fearing their loss of power and status.

The Serbs, at 36.3% of the total Yugoslav population, were the largest single ethnic group in unified Yugoslavia. In an independent Bosnia they would lose that status. The fear of subjugation to Bosniak Muslim ethnic majoritarian rule was sadly easily manipulated.

With declining Federal authority, Yugoslavia's longstanding military system of parallel command structures at the Federal and Republic level, with both the regular Army and territorial forces ultimately answering to the Federal civilian presidency, collapsed.

As civil war loomed the Federal army was disbanded and reconstituted as the military of the newly-founded Serb "[Federal Republic of Yugoslavia](#)." The new national army was not only dominated by Serbian officers, but it retained control of the arsenal of heavy weaponry, leverage that they would use to devastating effect.

The battles in the Croatian Krajina region were especially wanton. The Bosnian Serb entity of [Republika Srpska](#), established in summer 1991, created horrific PoW, concentration and extermination camps where predominantly [Bosniaks](#) were held, tortured, raped, and killed.

Non-Serbs, in the description of Human Rights Watch, were "cleansed" through "systematic persecution that includes [torture](#), [murder](#), [rape](#), beatings, [harassment](#), *de jure* discrimination, [intimidation](#), expulsion from homes, confiscation of property, bombing of businesses, dismissal from work, outlawing of all scripts except the Cyrillic in public institutions, and the destruction of cultural objects such as mosques and Catholic churches."

The severity of the initial Serb land and sea assaults, demolishing Croatia's city of Vukovar, the destruction sustained by its magnificent cities, including historic Dubrovnik, prompted international condemnation and recognition of Croatia's autonomy, initially by Iceland and then by Germany. It was the the lynch pin, formally dissolving Yugoslavia.

The disintegration of Yugoslavia accelerated. The tactics and level of violence were precursors to what was to occur in the Bosnian War itself.

Ultimately, Serb overreach and savagery were finally the tipping point that led to US-led NATO intervention, the shelling of Belgrade, the withdrawal of Serbs from their encirclement of Sarajevo, and the beginning of negotiations that culminated in the Dayton Accords.

The immediate critical purpose of the Dayton Agreement was to freeze the devastating military confrontation and prevent it from resuming. That succeeded.

Dayton ended the hostilities, but it did nothing to address reconciliation, and divided the country into a confederation between Republica Srpska and Bosnia and Montenegro. It reinforced and hardened physical and emotional territorial boundaries of new defensive, ethnic cantons.

The Dayton Agreement was also aimed at allowing Bosnia and Herzegovina to move from an early post-conflict phase through reconstruction and consolidation, adopting the consociational state as its model of governance.

Such a framework has divisions along ethnic, religious, or linguistic lines but with none of the divisions large enough to form a majority group. The goals of consociationalism are governmental stability, the survival of the power-sharing arrangements, the survival of [democracy](#), and the avoidance of [violence](#).

Some believe it was a very successful and even impressive example of conflict resolution. Others believe because it was imposed by external powers, (the parties to the agreement did not have to negotiate with each other, just agree), it took away the critical experience of compromise.

Many analysts believe it is radically flawed, and has led to systemic paralysis, with every important decision held hostage to opposing priorities based on ethnic identity and policies, not on shared ideals. Thus Dayton sowed the seeds of instability.

Tellingly, an external military presence, the European Union Force (EUFOR) a multinational force drawn from 20 countries, still is obliged to be stationed in Bosnia with the critical mission “to respond as required to support BiH authorities in the maintenance of a safe and secure environment...

EUFOR preserves the quiet, perhaps serving as Tito’s previous stabilizing coercive rule. Its liaison teams and networks of observation forces consult with the local communities and help "to feel the pulse" of the situation. The fear remains that in their absence, the still fractured country will enter the abyss of war once again.

Accountability, now many years after the overt war has ended, remains evasive and contentious.

The UN and CIA estimated that Serbian forces were responsible for 90% of the conflict's war crimes, with Croatian and Bosnian forces responsible for the other 10%. Yet many of each country’s ethnic citizens continue to believe that they had been singled out for unwarranted victimization and stigmatization.

The conclusion of the ICTY was that Srebrenica’s mass murder involved a systematic attempt to destroy the Muslim population, and therefore a genocide. Yet the decision and the ensuing ICC trials did little to heal the former Yugoslavia.

After a trial lasting more than four years, and involving the testimony of nearly 600 witnesses, the ICTY found Mladic, who had been dubbed the “Butcher of Bosnia,” after Srebrenica, guilty of genocide and other crimes against humanity in November 2017. The tribunal sentenced the 74-year-old former general to life in prison.

The ICC trials, which for many took an unconscionably long time, denied swift justice. It took 13 years to finally arrest Karadžić and bring him to The Hague for trial. The reality that he was able for the first two years following his initial indictment, in July 1995, to live quite openly in the alpine village of Pale outside Sarajevo, speaks to an unreconstructed society willing to protect him despite the abundant evidence of his war crimes.

Coming on the heels of Karadzic’s conviction for war crimes the previous year, Mladic’s long-delayed conviction marked the last major prosecution by the ICTY. The trial of Milosevic ended in a frustrating manner, with his death in prison after four years of incarceration, before justice could be rendered, and his actual decreed sentence served.

True communal accountability for war crimes is almost non-existent. Neighbors have been obliged to live together with the murderers of their parents and relatives, and to painfully coexist alongside people whom they know destroyed their homes and families. In these pages you will find Anthony Loyd’s compassionate story of Irena Omazic, who for years rode the same bus from her town Vitez to Sarajevo with her father’s killer. He was finally sentenced to 27 years in prison in 2018.

There has been restoration of public buildings, monuments, and infrastructure, including the famous *Stari Most*, the Old Bridge, which stood almost four centuries, until it was destroyed by Croat paramilitary forces in 1993 during the Croat–Bosniak War.

While there has been success in rehabilitating the country physically, demographically it is yet another story. Ethnic cleansing has conclusively redrawn many of the country’s borders and neighborhoods. There are

estimates that prior to the siege the population in the Sarajevo city proper was 435,000. The estimates of the number of persons living in Sarajevo after the siege ranged from between 300,000 and 380,000.

The scholar Ewa Tabeau, an expert on the demography of armed conflict records this tragic toll - of the 89,186 deceased Bosnians in the fighting, of all ethnicities, 35 % were civilians, 65% soldiers. Bosnian Muslim's lost 3.1 % of their total population, and 1.4 % of Bosnian Serb society died.

More significant is that the once culturally cosmopolitan, predominantly secular and sophisticated character of the city has radically changed. Sarajevo itself saw an extraordinary exodus of its intellectuals and middle class, with a quarter of its population composed of internal immigration from the rural, more uneducated and intolerant areas of the Bosnian countryside.

Its original distinctive tolerant non-orthodox Muslim character was weakened by a virulent Islamification. Many of its youth are taught in madrassas created by Saudi Arabia and Pakistan which funded many of the reconstruction projects in BiH. Many jihadists who joined ISIS came from this cauldron.

Minority returnees to BiH still face a variety of problems, including discriminatory property legislation, and administrative discrimination. The greatest problem minorities faced in the Sarajevo Canton is that they were not able to reclaim their pre-war homes. Minority representation on the police force is well below the ratios agreed upon at Dayton. Governance in Bosnia and the former Yugoslavia is extraordinarily weak and corrupt throughout.

Perhaps most indicative of the long-term fragility of what many consider to be a prolonged conditional ceasefire in BiH, rather than a lasting peace is the educational system. In Bosnia there are totally separate school times for the different ethnicities, sometimes in the very same school rooms, with entirely different biased curricula and history textbooks. Bosnia's educators, facing the inability to agree on a common narrative, literally and absurdly decided to ignore the war period in their curriculum.

Decades after the war casualties still occur, as Bosnia and Herzegovina remains one of the most heavily-mined contaminated countries in the world. But it is the emotional wounds that are most raw. The sectarian hatred and intense distrust simmer seemingly unabated. Many ethnic citizens are still insistent in their rationales of innocence and remain dangerously confident in their self-absorbed versions of history. Others simply have the audacity to mock the truth.

There are no signs of the leadership necessary to resolve to heal, or to even conceptualize or determine a common future. There are no words for the Bosnian national anthem. None could be agreed upon as sufficiently inclusive, so it is wordless.

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Imagine's articles and photographs tell the extraordinary human stories of the Bosnian War, accounts of unimaginable horror, and yet of survival. As Elvis Garibovic recounts after seeing a photographic display of inmates of the Nazi concentration camp Mauthausen, he recognized "the look," he once had as a prisoner in the Serb Trnopolja PoW camp in Bosnia - of pain, suffering, despair, sadness, hunger, but also *love, will, and hope.*"

Elvis was photographed by Ron Haviv in Trnopolja. He recounts the excruciating pain it took him to even stand up to be photographed, with the hopes that he might be recognized as still alive by his family, even in such debased circumstances. He knew so many families were doomed to never know the fate of their loved ones. Serb victims' were buried in mass graves, often intentionally in pieces to make identification almost impossible. Even after the war there was an enduring cruel conspiracy of silence, with Serb communities refusing to identify sites of mass graves for families desperate to understand the fate of their families.

There were also stories of rare interventions to save people, as in Elvis' situation when he was prevented by a Serb guard who was his neighbor from entering a bus he thought would lead to his freedom. It was a transport to a ravine where all the people on the bus were summarily executed.

Ron Haviv's photographs during the war tell the human pathos beyond the grim statistics, of Senad Medanovic, convulsed, standing on what is believed to be the mass grave where he family was buried; the inconsolable widows of Srebrenica; the humiliation and torture of helpless citizens by paramilitaries, and incomprehensible acts of cruel deliberation.

There is his image of painstakingly defaced photograph of razor thin strips cut into the faces of the Muslim Fako family obliterating their features. It was the only object left in their stripped home *after*, Dayton, revealing the sadistic searing hatred that still exists.

It is all the more remarkable therefore that there are signs of resilience and seeds of reconciliation. Ron's photographs when he returned to Bosnia indicate the efforts of Bosnian society's renewal with nightclub life, fashion shows, and memorials. Yet more so the entrenched segregation of different schools, deep grief, and denial of accountability. Two photographs, one of the emotional release by widows of Srebrenica at the conviction of Mladic; another the prayers offered by Croats after the suicide of General Praljak, a convicted war criminal, supported by the Croatian Bishops speak to the deep divide.

Survivors live with rationalizations. One source of solace for some interethnic communities that still exist, is that knowing the killers were not of their own community, but outsiders, somehow makes it easier to bear their pain and outrage, and allows them to coexist with their neighbors.

There are also survivors who understand that the inability to forgive is a corrosive force. One man believes the forgiveness that he finds in his heart allows him to experience the feeling of "cleansing," thereby allowing himself, and he believes other people, whose lives were destroyed, and families and friends murdered, not to remain victims.

There are remarkable individual efforts. Kwart, an NGO dedicated to reconciliation through educating local youth groups is located in the especially murderous Prijedor region, the area of the infamous Kareterm massacre, and the Omarska rape camp, and the area with the highest number of convicted war criminals in Bosnia.

It is organized by an unusual man, Branko Culibrk, a Serb paramilitary fighter who lost his father in the war. He rebukes his friends who are astonished by his forgiveness "I don't know whose bullet killed my dad, but anyway it is not a reason to hate someone."

There are also interviews testifying to survivors' incredulity about the nature of people able to inflict such pain on people they knew as neighbors, the horror, all the more horrific, as Andrew Loyd understands, for its "intimacy,"

He describes that beneath the facade and thin veneer of peace, there are still songs sung by Serbs, commemorating and celebrating the murder of Muslims.

The poignant question remains, can a new generation offer hope for Bosnia? With the world's highest rate of youth unemployment at 67.6 percent, and ranking 16th in the world on emigration rates, this is a formidable challenge. Trauma surely remains. Of Sarajevo's 80,000 children, researchers believe that at least 40% had been directly shot at by snipers, and just over 50% have seen someone killed.

Loyd poignantly concludes that "reconciliation is an orphan in Bosnia." It is well understood that reconciliation and forgiveness are essential components for an enduring peace. In Bosnia the concern is that the prospects for such a peace are now remote and perhaps illusory.